Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

Blouin, Max; Pallage, Stephane

doi:10.2139/ssrn.967471

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Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 07-06

15 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2007

See all articles by Max Blouin

Max Blouin

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics

Stephane Pallage

University of Quebec at Montreal - Department of Economics; Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi (CIRPÉE)

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. We identify a delivery plan for aid which minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

Keywords: Humanitarian aid, food aid, civil war, warlords, famine

JEL Classification: O10, F35, D74

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Blouin, Max and Pallage, Stephane, Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict (March 2007). CIRPEE Working Paper No. 07-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967471