Disability Per Se is Not Bar to Jury Service

Abstract

In this article the author defines the civil right of disabled people to Normal life. His identification of this right is supported by Lord Slynn in the landmark case of the most superior court of the UK (the House of Lords) in the famous case of Halliday of 1997. Adopting a purposive and justice-oriented approach to this issue, Lord Slynn enunciates that a nation should strive to enable a disabled person lead as normal life as possible. His Lordship emphasized that the yardstick of a normal life is important; it is a better approach than adopting the test as to whether something is "essential" or "desirable."

The legal right of disabled people to normal life (recognized by 45 countries who have passed protective legislation) is deemed by the author to be mother of all civil rights. Using this juristic premise as a touchstone, he has argued for design for all in this article. Focusing on the treatment of deaf people in jury service, for instance, he says, The disabled people are only interested in fair recognition of their capabilities and wish to obviate the insult that that they are incapable of performing on a jury effectively. He recognizes that, although not perfect, the US pro-disabled statues are best in the world. He invites other nations to learn from this regime in promulgating their own laws.

Keywords: disability, jury service, risk, disability

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K22, K23, K41