Access Regulation and Cross-Border Mergers: Is International Coordination Beneficial?

28 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2007

See all articles by Kjell Erik Lommerud

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Trond E. Olsen

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)

Date Written: November 30, 2005

Abstract

The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.

Keywords: Access regulation, Endogenous merger, Policy coordination

JEL Classification: L13, L41, L50

Suggested Citation

Lommerud, Kjell Erik and Olsen, Trond E. and Straume, Odd Rune and Straume, Odd Rune, Access Regulation and Cross-Border Mergers: Is International Coordination Beneficial? (November 30, 2005). NHH Dept. of Finance & Management Science Discussion Paper No. 2005/8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=970233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.970233

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 5 558 9209 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Trond E. Olsen (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway
+47 55 95 99 76 (Phone)
+47 55 95 96 50 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )

Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
53
Abstract Views
840
Rank
681,640
PlumX Metrics