Separating Reputation, Social Influence, and Identification Effects in a Dictator Game
32 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2007 Last revised: 5 Feb 2008
Date Written: February 4, 2008
Abstract
This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators' actions than the social influence and identification.
Keywords: experimental economics, dictator game, indirect reciprocity, reputation, social influence, identification
JEL Classification: C70, C91, D63, D64
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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