Separating Reputation, Social Influence, and Identification Effects in a Dictator Game

32 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2007 Last revised: 5 Feb 2008

See all articles by Maroš Servátka

Maroš Servátka

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory

Date Written: February 4, 2008

Abstract

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators' actions than the social influence and identification.

Keywords: experimental economics, dictator game, indirect reciprocity, reputation, social influence, identification

JEL Classification: C70, C91, D63, D64

Suggested Citation

Servátka, Maroš, Separating Reputation, Social Influence, and Identification Effects in a Dictator Game (February 4, 2008). University of Arizona Working Paper No. Econ-WP-07-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=972747 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.972747

Maroš Servátka (Contact Author)

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Sydney
Australia

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