Download This PaperPareto Inefficiency of Market Economies: Search and Efficiency Wage Models
18 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2007 Last revised: 1 Oct 2022
Date Written: July 1988
Abstract
This paper shows that market economies with search and in which wages are affected by efficiency wage considerations are not constrained Pareto efficient. Wages are not set at Pareto efficient levels, nor is the level of employment (unemployment) Pareto efficient. We identify the nature of the biases and the welfare improving government interventions.
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Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )
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Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )
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