Download This PaperManipulability of Voting Schemes
4 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2008 Last revised: 22 Nov 2016
Date Written: March 1, 2008
Abstract
In the article it is proved that manipulability of a voting procedure depends on reliable information on the expected outcome of a voting rather than on violation of the Arrow’s conditions in disproof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem.
Keywords: manipulability, voting, strategy-proofness, reliable information
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JEL Classification: D71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Vasiljev, Sergei and Zhanaheva, Anna, Manipulability of Voting Schemes (March 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1118627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1118627
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