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Note on the Calibration of Executive Compensation Models

17 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2011 Last revised: 23 Nov 2011

See all articles by Ingolf Dittmann

Ingolf Dittmann

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Dan Zhang

Oslo Business School

Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Oliver G. Spalt

University of Mannheim - Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 17, 2011

Abstract

This note is intended for researchers who want to implement the Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibration method. This method allows to test a complete principal-agent model with individual-level data on executive pay. The method consists of two steps. First, the principal-agent model is simplified so that it can be calibrated to the data for an individual CEO. After that, the calibrated model yields predictions about the optimal contract of this CEO, and these predictions can then be compared to observed contracts. This note contains step-by-step instructions on how to replicate the core results of Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010). We report intermediate results for an example CEO, so that different parts of the program code can be tested individually.

Keywords: Stock Options, Executive Compensation, Loss Aversion

JEL Classification: G30, M52

Suggested Citation

Dittmann, Ingolf and Zhang, Dan and Maug, Ernst G. and Spalt, Oliver G., Note on the Calibration of Executive Compensation Models (September 17, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1876670

Ingolf Dittmann (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 4081283 (Phone)
+31 10 4089165 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/

Tinbergen Institute

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Dan Zhang

Oslo Business School ( email )

Oslo Business School
Pilestredet 35, Room PE739
OSLO, 0166

Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School ( email )

L9, 1-2
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
+49 621 181-1952 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cf.bwl.uni-mannheim.de/de/people/maug/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Oliver G. Spalt

University of Mannheim - Business School ( email )

L5, 5
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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