Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: Ii. Positional Voting

Posted: 6 Dec 1999

See all articles by Donald G. Saari

Donald G. Saari

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Abstract

A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen profile. This includes all outcomes, paradoxes, and disagreements among positional procedure outcomes as well as all discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all illustrating profiles. It is shown how to use this approach to derive properties of methods based on pairwise and positional voting outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed here.

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Saari, Donald G., Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: Ii. Positional Voting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=195769

Donald G. Saari (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

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