The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century

80 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2014

See all articles by Julian R. Franks

Julian R. Franks

London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Hideaki Miyajima

Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce; Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Date Written: February 17, 2014

Abstract

Twentieth century Japan provides a remarkable laboratory for examining how an externally imposed institutional and regulatory intervention affects the ownership of corporations. In the first half of the century, Japan had weak legal protection but strong institutional arrangements. The institutions were dismantled after the war and replaced by a strong form of legal protection. This inversion resulted in a switch from Japan being a country in which equity markets flourished and ownership was dispersed in the first half of the century to one in which banks and companies dominated with interlocking shareholdings in the second half of the century.

Keywords: Japan, corporate ownership, insider system, trust, investor protection

JEL Classification: G32, K22

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R. and Mayer, Colin and Miyajima, Hideaki, The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century (February 17, 2014). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 410/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2397142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397142

Julian R. Franks

London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )

Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: https://ecgi.global/

Colin Mayer (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Hideaki Miyajima

Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce ( email )

1-6-1, Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan
(81 3) 5286 2019 (Phone)
(81 3) 3203 7067 (Fax)

Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) ( email )

1-3-1 Kasumigaseki
Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo 100-8901
Japan

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