Neutral Freedom and Freedom as Control
46 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2015 Last revised: 9 Dec 2018
Date Written: December 8, 2018
Abstract
I present a model of freedom as control. Control is measured by the preferences of a decision-maker, or judge, who values flexibility and is neutral towards outcomes ex ante. Formally, I explore the consequences of adding a neutrality axiom to the Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) axioms for preference for flexibility. I characterize the consensus of all neutral judges about which choice situations embody more freedom. The theory extends the freedom ranking literature to situations where agents have imperfect control, as modeled by choices among lotteries. In a voting context, the consensus of neutral judges coincides with Banzhaf power.
Keywords: freedom, neutrality, control, preference for flexibility
JEL Classification: D63, D71, D81
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation