Neutral Freedom and Freedom as Control

46 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2015 Last revised: 9 Dec 2018

See all articles by Itai Sher

Itai Sher

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Date Written: December 8, 2018

Abstract

I present a model of freedom as control. Control is measured by the preferences of a decision-maker, or judge, who values flexibility and is neutral towards outcomes ex ante. Formally, I explore the consequences of adding a neutrality axiom to the Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) axioms for preference for flexibility. I characterize the consensus of all neutral judges about which choice situations embody more freedom. The theory extends the freedom ranking literature to situations where agents have imperfect control, as modeled by choices among lotteries. In a voting context, the consensus of neutral judges coincides with Banzhaf power.

Keywords: freedom, neutrality, control, preference for flexibility

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JEL Classification: D63, D71, D81

Suggested Citation

Sher, Itai, Neutral Freedom and Freedom as Control (December 8, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2652913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2652913

Itai Sher (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Amherst, MA 01003
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/itaisher/

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