Object and Purpose Control in Trade Disputes: Lessons from the CJEU for WTO Reform

22 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2022

See all articles by Matthias Goldmann

Matthias Goldmann

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law; Goethe University Frankfurt; EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Date Written: August 17, 2021

Abstract

This article argues that WTO dispute settlement should address distortions of international trade law caused by contemporary state capitalism by controlling domestic measures for their compatibility with the object and purpose of the WTO. The article begins by examining EU countermeasures against Egypt-based, Chinese state-owned company Jushi Egypt and argues that, under the current state of trade law, the subsidies in question would be compatible with WTO law. However, ruling out trade defences against subsidies like these, which are aimed at skirting the rules of international trade, would undermine WTO law in the long term. The article therefore proposes that WTO dispute settlement should drop its textualism and follow the example of the CJEU in the “Portuguese Judges” case and enforce the fundamental values of WTO law, its object and purpose, against measures of the member states. After arguing that the WTO does indeed have a common purpose, epitomized by the notion of sustainable development, the article demonstrates how this approach could be operationalized and discovers accommodating tendencies in the case law.

Keywords: trade law, subsidies, State-owned Enterprises, sustainable development, treaty interpretation

Suggested Citation

Goldmann, Matthias, Object and Purpose Control in Trade Disputes: Lessons from the CJEU for WTO Reform (August 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3997057 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3997057

Matthias Goldmann (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ( email )

Im Neuenheimer Feld 535
69120 Heidelberg, 69120
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/organization/scientific_staff/mgoldman.cfm

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
HoF H4
Frankfurt, 60629
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/62222403/Goldmann

EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht ( email )

Gustav-Stresemann-Ring 3
Wiesbaden, Hessen 65189
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

0 References

    0 Citations

      Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

      Paper statistics

      Downloads
      176
      Abstract Views
      556
      Rank
      358,137
      PlumX Metrics