The Need for Fees at a DEX: How Increases in Fees Can Increase DEX Trading Volume

48 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2022 Last revised: 13 Dec 2022

See all articles by Joel Hasbrouck

Joel Hasbrouck

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Thomas J Rivera

McGill University

Fahad Saleh

University of Florida

Date Written: August 17, 2022

Abstract

We model endogenous trading and liquidity provision at a decentralized exchange (DEX) and demonstrate that increasing DEX trading fees can increase DEX trading volume. DEXs employ a mechanical pricing rule whereby price impacts decrease with inventory which DEXs acquire by offering fee revenues to investors. Consequently, higher DEX fees can incentivize higher inventory, thereby reducing price impacts. Moreover, the reduction of price impact can offset the increase in fees so that the marginal cost of DEX trading declines despite charging a higher trading fee. In turn, lower DEX marginal trading costs lead to an increase in DEX trading volume.

Keywords: Decentralized Exchange, DEX, Automated Market Makers, AMM

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JEL Classification: G10, G12

Suggested Citation

Hasbrouck, Joel and Rivera, Thomas and Saleh, Fahad, The Need for Fees at a DEX: How Increases in Fees Can Increase DEX Trading Volume (August 17, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4192925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4192925

Joel Hasbrouck

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

44 West 4th Street
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Thomas Rivera

McGill University ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St W
Montreal, Quebec h3A 1G5

Fahad Saleh (Contact Author)

University of Florida ( email )

Warrington College of Business
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cryptoeconprof.com

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