Let’s Agree to Disagree: A Strategy for Trade-Security

Journal of International Economic Law, 24(4) 2022.

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Forthcoming

22 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2022 Last revised: 10 Nov 2022

See all articles by Mona Paulsen

Mona Paulsen

London School of Economics - Law School

Date Written: October 31, 2022

Abstract

Unpredictable dynamics coupled with the WTO rules’ exclusivity of security challenge an institution that requires persistent coordination and transparency to function. WTO members need space to discuss – and disagree with – the intersection of security and trade policies. Deliberation of trade security is crucial for maintaining multilateral coordination, enabling governments, businesses, and individuals to navigate global economic networks. While members make (somewhat) use of existing WTO institutions and procedures, the exceptionalism and secrecy of security hinder information sharing and peer review of security-rooted trade practices. This article provides a descriptive analysis and prescriptions for WTO institutional techniques for addressing members’ security-related measures daily – that is, on a routine basis, via trade policy review and WTO notification processes. It shows that the trade community already possess the tools to manage the growing issue-area of trade and security. The unanswered question is whether WTO members see value in discussing security at the WTO.

Keywords: trade and security, trade, national security, WTO, World Trade Organization

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Suggested Citation

Pinchis-Paulsen, Mona, Let’s Agree to Disagree: A Strategy for Trade-Security (October 31, 2022). Journal of International Economic Law, 24(4) 2022., LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4251781

Mona Pinchis-Paulsen (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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