How Do Health Insurance Costs Affect Low- and High-Income Workers?

59 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2023 Last revised: 7 Feb 2025

See all articles by Janet Gao

Janet Gao

McDonough School of Business

Shan Ge

New York University, Stern School of Business

Lawrence Schmidt

MIT Sloan School of Management

Cristina Tello-Trillo

Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census; Yale University, Department of Economics

Date Written: August 18, 2022

Abstract

Given that employer-sponsored health insurance constitutes a significant component of labor costs, we examine the causal effect of insurance premiums on worker outcomes across the income distribution. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument premiums using idiosyncratic variation in insurers' recent losses, which is plausibly exogenous to worker outcomes. Analyzing US administrative data, we demonstrate that firms reduce employment following premium increases. Importantly, higher premiums adversely affect lower-income workers but not high-income workers. Following instrumented premium increases, low-income workers face higher risks of job separation, unemployment, large earnings losses, transitions to staffing arrangements, and reduced wage growth even when retained. In contrast, high-income workers experience minimal or opposite effects.

Keywords: Health insurance, insurer losses, worker skills, firm employment, inequality, technology investment, low-income workers, unemployment, job separation, staffing, wages

JEL Classification: G22, G31, G28, G18, J01, J08, J32, J22, J23

Suggested Citation

Gao, Janet and Ge, Shan and Schmidt, Lawrence and Tello-Trillo, Cristina, How Do Health Insurance Costs Affect Low- and High-Income Workers? (August 18, 2022). HKU Jockey Club Enterprise Sustainability Global Research Institute - Archive, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4496766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4496766

Janet Gao

McDonough School of Business ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Shan Ge (Contact Author)

New York University, Stern School of Business ( email )

44 W 4th St
Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012
United States

Lawrence Schmidt

MIT Sloan School of Management ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/lawrencedwschmidt/home

Cristina Tello-Trillo

Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census ( email )

4600 Silver Hill Road
Washington, DC 20233-9100
United States

Yale University, Department of Economics

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

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